Rules of Engagement

Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the Law of War (LOW) have been created to add civility to war and restrict self-defense to the most extreme conditions. That’s probably as simply as it can be explained. It can also be explained as a basis for death and defeat if your opponent doesn’t believe in civility and wants only to win.

How do you create an ROE for fighting an insurgency, a conflict which some may refer to as being fought by “Freedom Fighters” in Bosnia, a conflict which some may refer to as genocide in Rwanda or Darfur, while others may justly refer to it as an internal political conflict? Each war or conflict would require different interpretations of ROE or LOW.

When the “surge” of 21,000 more troops to Iraq was first proposed, I must admit I very seriously found it to be a waste since the war was being so deeply controlled on the ground by politics that the additional troops seemed too late or served little to no meaning in the pursuit of a “victory”—whatever that term is supposed to mean.

The war to date, after driving insurgents out of an area, the troops were left without any attempt at area stabilization; Shiite and Sunni insurgents were treated differently as to any action by Iraqi and US troops, and some of the captured insurgents were released at political request. When President Bush presented his “new” plan, with some of those restrictions released, he was returning to a "new" old form of war to meet the changes in the formula of the conflict, reconsideration was required.

There is still a question as to whether 21,000 additional troops are required to accomplish what wasn’t or should have been done before. Quite interesting was that the day after Bush spoke, Sadr’s Shiite troops were told to fold into the citizen population—a controlled response. So, it really was not a new plan, but it is, in fact, a challenge to a recovery with Iraqi forces in the front and with back-up American support.

There are those who say that we are only sustaining 3,000 dead as opposed to the 58,000 plus in prior wars—the death of one American is too much; but without stabilization, there will be no stemming of the world terror, which will continue to bring death. The basic difference is the nature of the present conflict where a majority number are not killed in confrontational battle, but with roadside bombs, suicide bombers, torture and execution, etc. Thus, the ROE and LOW must be totally reconfigured so that our troops do not stand open to death because of some obsolete concept of clean fighting or civility or being nice guys to meet UN requirements for American embarrassment while playing footsies with Iran’s quest for nuclear power.

Anti-War people claim that this war has lasted longer than WWII and Vietnam. Well, collateral damage was not then a concern—Tokyo, London, Dresden—and more particularly the bombing of two Japanese cities which immediately led to the termination of hostilities and negotiations for peace. Will those who oppose the Iraq war now suggest atomic destruction of Baghdad or Basra or Tehran or Damascus as a quick solution? I doubt it, since that is not the American Way.

Nor, was it a concern in Vietnam where the at-home political system demonized the American troops, putting the shackles on the war and forcing a peace treaty based on political advantage and training for the global terrorism which followed and exists today. There again there was no post-war planning other than hate for the returning troops and a paper tiger approach to diplomacy.

This time, they will not demonize the troops since many of them are fathers and mothers from the Guard and Reserves together with the volunteer troops—this time it was much easier to place the blame-"just blame it on Bush", who frankly did screw up in many respects with incompetent intelligence and failure to treat a war as a war with post-war plans, stabilization or exit strategy. Other than calling for withdrawal, redeployment and the return of troops—no one has come up with a practical approach to reconcile and resolve the situation other than the Baker Iraq Report, which wants us to meet for an afternoon tea with Syria and Iran and have them put the Middle East and Iraq in order [their particular form of order]—the Report did not say whether we do it before or after they have nuclear power or after they have secured control of the Middle East—isn’t diplomacy grand?

For well over 40 years, we secured a truce in Europe when the US and USSR, both having nuclear equality, came up with theories of Flexible Response and Mutual Assured Destruction and brinksmanship. The notion of American subservience to Europe's needs satisfied our friends. While we then put ourselves on the line, Europe found reason to reduce their defense expenditures by retaining American Forces on the ground and in NATO and condemning our world actions and performing as pompous moral hypocrites. Giving the devil its due, there are now NATO forces in Afghanistan.

When Bush proclaimed in 2002 that Democracy was a required ingredient in the Middle East and the world for peace, our allied and moderates laughed and condemned us while retaining and probably expanding their own national economic advantages in the region. Money again talked. And when millions voted in Iraq, our moderate Arab friends went through the appearance of a voting process while retaining their authoritarian power over their countries. Appearance was more important to them than securing peace. When a request was made for the intervention of our moderate [read Sunni] Arab friends with respect to Iraq, Iran and Syria, they rejected their Regional obligations and instead demanded that the US would assume that they would ignore the regional necessity and would solve their problems by dangling oil as a sword of Damocles. They should at least use that oil and economic power to help contain Iran and Syria and Al Qaeda, cutting off the breath of money to the terrorists. It would help.

Bush rejected the concept that America was the world’s policeman to be called upon without obligation to any other nation and adopted the position that those nations involved in an area must join in a regional group to oppose the danger to a regions such as in Liberia, North Korea, or wherever required, and proclaimed that the US will no longer be the world’s sucker as we were in Vietnam when we replaced the defeated French troops who then proceeded to condemn our actions together not only with our allies [?] but with American public opinion polls. Now there is recognition that America will not waste our money and youth without a commitment by those affected in a Region.

Even now, Somalia and Darfur are not left to die with only US troops, with African opposition and UN condemnation. If that were the case before, would the genocide in Rwanda have occurred without intervention? I think not, for, if you recall, Europe didn’t go into Bosnia until the US agreed to go there.

The challenge in now before us and transcends hatred of Bush. Hatred of any individual is worthless as a solution where there is no back-up plan—which is the reason for the creation of Bush hatred on Iraq. By emulating the Bush missteps, we all lose. It goes beyond security alone. It even goes beyond America being the world’s superpower. It goes to the point and ability of either a superiority or equality to make war and with that ability in place to make peace or an enforceable truce. The new face of war with its insurgency and guerrilla methodology requires not victory, but the sustaining of success with an enemy which restrains its actions. It also requires the military wherewithal to enforece the conditions.

The Rules of Engagement and the Law of War must not merely be revised but totally restructured to meet current requirements for success. We should not be constrained in going against an enemy which hides itself behind religious or civilian facades.

If there is to be a bloodbath, let it be theirs.